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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4472
The economy of the Philippines is open to trade and 
capital inflows, and has grown rapidly since 2002. Over 
the last 10 years, however, domestic investment, while 
stagnant in real terms, has shrunk as a share of GDP. In 
an open and growing economy, why the decline? Three 
reasons explain the puzzle. First, the public sector cannot 
afford expanding its investment at GDP growth rates.  
Second, the capital-intensive private sector does not find 
it convenient to raise investment at the economy’s pace.  
Third, fast-growing businesses in the service sector do not 
need to rapidly increase investment to enjoy rising profits. 
Yet, the economy keeps growing. On the demand-side, 
massive labor migration results in remittances that fuel 
consumption-led-growth. On the supply-side, free 
This paper—a product of the Office of the Chief Economist of the East Asia and Pacific Region—is part of a larger effort 
to investigate the sustainability of growth in East Asia. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at amagnoli@worldbank.org.
from rent-capturing regulations, a few non-capital-
intensive manufactures and services boost exports. The 
economic system is in equilibrium at a low level of capital 
stock, where all economic agents have no incentive to 
unilaterally increase investment and the first mover bears 
short-term costs. As a consequence, growth is slower 
and less inclusive than it could be. To make it speedier 
and more sustainable, and to reduce unemployment and 
poverty, the economy needs to move to a “high-capital-
stock” equilibrium. This would be attainable through 
better-performing eco-zones, a competitive exchange rate, 
greater government revenues, and fewer élite-capturing 
regulations. 
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In an open and growing economy, why does investment decline? This question - 
addressed in the context of the Philippines - is the focus of this paper. The Filipino economy 
is open to trade and capital inflows, and since 2002, growth has averaged 5.3 percent (Table 
1), led by the service sector. Over the last 15 years, however, domestic investment has been 
stagnant in real terms and consistently declining as a share of GDP. 
 
Three reasons explain this puzzle: in the Philippines, investment does not grow at the pace 
of GDP because the public sector cannot afford it, the capital-intensive private sector does 
not want to expand that fast, and the rest of the private sector does not need it. 
 
a.  First, the public sector – constrained by serious fiscal pressures, due to decades of 
weak revenue performance, a weighty debt service and a high cost of inputs – cannot 
keep public investment growing at GDP growth rates; 
 
b.  Second, the capital-intensive private sector does not find it convenient to expand 
investment at the economy’s fast pace, as it expects little returns. The marginal 
product of capital (MPK) is low, for two reasons: i) the public sector does not invest 
enough to provide incentives for private investment; and ii) inputs are expensive 
because of élite-capture in the traditional sectors of the economy (agriculture, sea and 
air transport, power, cement, mining, banking, etc). There, the politically-connected 
corporate conglomerates - protected by favorable rules and regulations - enjoy 
barriers to entry and oligopolistic market power, and sell at a high price the products 
(agricultural commodities, transport services, electricity, cement, etc.) that are critical 
inputs for both upstream and downstream sectors. Also, they pay higher wages - 
relative to other Asian countries - to the salaried insiders, thus securing “national 
labor peace” with their rents; and 
 
c.  Third, the fast-growing businesses in the service sector - electronics assembly, voice-
based business process outsourcing (BPO), and information and communication 
  5technology (ICT) - do not need to increase their investment at GDP growth rates to 
enjoy fast-rising profits. 
 
Yet, despite the resulting decline in investment, the economy keeps growing; and this is 
because its least protected sectors - the informal labor market and the non-capital-intensive 
activities - stimulate demand and drive supply. On the demand-side, work-seekers – denied 
entry into the formal labor market - migrate massively to industrialized economies, attracted 
by better remuneration; the resulting remittances and transfers (which, combined, account for 
over 13 percent of GDP) fuel consumption-led-growth - and lower the penalty for élite-
capturing policies. On the supply-side, the service sector and a few non-capital-intensive 
manufactures, free from rent-capturing regulations, boost exports. 
 
In equilibrium at a low-level of capital stock. In the status quo, the well-protected 
corporate conglomerates take advantage of the political system to enjoy oligopolistic 
privileges - and then use the resulting rents to stabilize the economy. The resulting self-
interested political constituencies, in equilibrium, perpetuate the status quo. The economic 
agents have no incentives to unilaterally increase investment, because the first-mover will 
bear short-term costs: while the public sector faces macroeconomic fragility, the capital-
intensive private sector is dealing with a low MPK. As a result, the economic system is in 
equilibrium at a “low-level of capital stock”. In the short-medium term, low levels of 
investments are rational, and the “low-capital-stock” equilibrium is delivering economic 
growth, which - although not creating jobs (the unemployment rate is at almost 8 percent) - 
seems sustainable. 
 
For future competitiveness, it is essential to reverse the present under-investment. 
Indeed, it is difficult to see how, at present levels of investment, a sufficiently robust growth 
can be sustained in the longer term, which is essential to deal with the country’s longer term 
development challenges (i.e., generate more jobs and reduce poverty). The country’s growth 
potential is untapped because of today’s inadequate investment. To reach speedier and more 
inclusive growth and sustain it in the long term, the country needs to address its lack of 
competitiveness. 
 
  6  7
                                                
To sustain growth the economy needs a phased competitive diversification ... What is 
needed is a market-driven expansion of non-traditional products. Given the strength of rent-
seeking interests, moving too abruptly would entail political risks; hence, the reform of 
ologopolistic practices in the traditional sectors of the economy can occur only gradually. To 
mitigate and postpone confrontation with rent-seekers, the Government should follow a 
three-pronged strategy: (i) start by getting the economic zones right
2 - while pursuing a 
competitive real effective exchange rate
3 - in order to promote new exportables; (ii) increase 
revenues, to finance the needed boost in infrastructure and education spending; and (iii) 
implement gradual reforms to tackle the rent-seeking conglomerate economy.  
 
… and concrete measures to open oligopolistic markets. Over time, as a result of this 
phased approach, the expanding competitive sectors should shrink the relative size of the 
rent-driven economy, and - in association with the businesses that are bearing the costs of 
rent-seeking - build a pro-reform political constituency, without creating conspicuous losers. 
At that point, the Government should move to reduce élite-capture. Greater competition in 
ports and shipping, civil air transport, wholesale electricity and cement production markets 
would substantially reduce costs, spur investments, and create jobs. Reducing protection for 
agricultural products, particularly rice, will benefit the food processing and livestock 
industries. Political reforms are needed to trigger and sustain these economic gains. 
 
The economy needs to reach an equilibrium that is more conducive to sustainable 
growth.  In conclusion, moving to a “high-capital-stock” equilibrium – attainable through 
fewer élite-capturing regulations, more public-private risk-sharing, and greater government 
revenues - is needed to sustain speedier and more inclusive growth, and to reduce 
unemployment and poverty more rapidly. 
 
 
2 See Box 1 page 37. 
3 The average inflation-adjusted exchange rate against all trading partners.  
1. The puzzle: an open and growing economy, but investment is declining  
 
 
The Filipino economy is open to trade and capital inflows. After the political and debt 
crisis of the 1980s, the government implemented market-based economic reforms, resulting 
in a more outward-oriented economic system (Figure 1). The main policies included 
liberalizing trade, oil, telecommunications, and domestic shipping; opening up to foreign 
direct investment; privatizing government assets; and strengthening the central bank’s 
independence. Services are rapidly becoming the dominant sector in the economy and 
account today for more than 50 percent of GDP (Figure 2). 
 

















































Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2007. 
Figure 2. … in a service economy 
 
Share of Services in GDP (%)









Source: Asian Development Outlook, 2007. 
 
Since 2002, growth has been higher than in the past. Over the past 40 years, the country 
struggled to raise economic growth (from its historical trend of 3.8 percent) above population 
growth (Figure 1).  In 2002-06, the economy - driven by services - grew at 5.3 percent, well 
above its past performance
4 - but only average in its neighborhood (Table 1).  
                                                 
4 For the first time since the 1970s, growth performed at 5 or more percent for three consecutive years.  
Table 1. The economy is growing ...  Figure 3. … but investment is declining 
  2004  2005  2006  2002-
06 
Emerging East Asia  8.0  7.5  7.8 7.4 
  Develop. E. Asia  9.1  9.0  9.2 8.8 
    S.E. Asia  6.0  5.1  5.2 5.3 
      Indonesia  5.1  5.6  5.5 5.2 
      Malaysia  7.2  5.2  5.5 5.5 
      Philippines  6.2  5.0  5.4 5.3 
      Thailand  6.2  4.5  4.5 5.3 
    Transition Econ.         
      China  10.1  10.2  10.4 9.9 
      Vietnam  7.8  8.4  8.0 7.7 
    Small Economies  6.6  7.6  6.0 5.7 
  Newly Ind. Econ.  6.0  4.7  5.1 4.8 
      Chinese Taipei  6.1  4.0  4.0  4.3 
      Hong Kong, China    8.6  7.3  5.9  4.7 
      Korea  4.7  4.0  5.1  4.7 
      Singapore  8.7  6.4  7.4  5.7 
 
Source: World Bank East Asia Update, November 2006.  Source:  World Bank, 2006a. 
















As of the late 1990s, investment has been on a declining path. In almost all post-crisis 
economies of East Asia investment is far from pre-crisis levels
5. However, since 1997, gross 
fixed investment in the Philippines has been stagnant in real terms and has declined as a share 
of GDP, thinning out to less than 15 percent (Figure 1 and Figure 3).  
 
1a. What’s falling is domestic investment  
 
The financial crisis took a toll on both public and private balance sheets.  After 1997, 
revenue collection weakened
6, the fiscal deficit increased sharply, and the central 
government debt rose to over 65 percent of GDP. Limited by these fiscal constraints and by a 
poor investment environment, gross fixed capital formation declined as a share of GDP to the 
lowest level in 20 years. Public capital spending moved in a pro-cyclical rather than a 
counter-cyclical direction, falling to an estimated 2.3 percent of GDP in 2004-05 (Figure 4). 
The cuts in public investment led to under-investment in infrastructure and public education; 
the resulting deficiencies added to the ongoing decline in private investment. 
                                                 
5 Investment does not necessarily need to return to pre-crisis levels. In the early 1990s it may have been 
excessive, with resources allocated to lower return or unproductive projects, leading to a buildup of 
financial vulnerabilities. 
6 The Government provided tax incentives and loosened tax administration. 
  9The investment decline is primarily due to lower domestic investment.  Of the overall 
investment decline, domestic investment fell by 80 percent, while foreign investment 
decreased by 15 percent (Figure 4).
7 Adding an element of rigidity to the downturn, 40 
percent of the overall decline was due to lower construction (Figure 5).
8  
 






































Source: National Statistical Coordination Board 

































Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2007 
 
Private investment fell despite rising growth. The private sector found serious 
impediments to investing in the poor transportation network, the declining quality of 
education and the high cost of inputs, particularly electricity.
9 Between 2000 and 2004, 
private investment - deterred by political instability and systemic uncertainties - did not 
respond to higher growth (Figure 4 and Figure 5), and private sector credit fell by 40 percent 
as a share of GDP. 
                                                 
7 In recent years, foreign investments have grown from a small base (from 2005 to 2006, net FDI inflows 
have reached $2 billion, growing to 14 percent of the overall private investment), but are still too small to 
matter, and many investment approvals have not translated into actual flows. 
8 There is evidence that busts in the real estate tend to be longer-lived than in other asset markets, and tend 
to be associated with more severe downturns in overall economic activity. For example, in industrial 
countries, the evidence for housing market busts suggests they have an average duration of 4-5 years 
compared to 2-3 years for equity market busts (World Bank, 2006a). 
9 Based on the competitiveness ranking of the World Economic Forum on basic infrastructure, the 
Philippines placed 89th out of 102 countries surveyed. 
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1b. Despite a more favorable environment, appetite is low  
 
Since 2004, the investment environment has become more favorable ... In 2004, to 
address its fiscal challenge, the government launched a comprehensive reform program 
(including the adoption of the VAT), and during 2005-06 carried out a fiscal adjustment, 
accompanied by an enhanced tax effort. The improved outlook generated a more stable 
investment environment, potentially attractive for private capital inflows. Moreover, firms - 
in their fixed investment decisions - are today less influenced by the debt overhang, which 
constrained them during the late 1990s
10. Also, the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) 
shows that in the post-crisis period investment efficiency has improved.
11 Finally, surveys 
indicate a greater propensity to invest, as average capacity utilization rates - mainly in the 
manufacturing sector - have increased to over 80 percent.
12  
 































































Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, 2007. 






































Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, 2007. 
 
                                                 
10 Firms with high debt-asset ratios face higher premiums and rarely finance new investments externally. 
11 The economy-wide ICOR is measured by the investment in a given period divided by the change in GDP 
in that period; it is also measured by the ratio of investment to GDP divided by the growth rate of GDP 
(World Bank, 2006a). 
12 This is suggesting private investment should pick up: with remittance-assisted personal consumption 
growing by more than 5 percent, firms would eventually need to increase investment to fulfill this demand.  
Moreover, consumer imports comprise less than 4 percent of GDP, whereas personal consumption accounts 
for 78 percent, indicating that the bulk of the increasing demand can be expected to be supplied by higher 
local production. 
  11… and there is ample liquidity in the economy ... Favored by the government’s fiscal 
efforts, gross domestic savings rose to 19.8 percent of GDP in 2006 (up from 17.1 in 2001). 
The current account (Figure 6)
13 is in surplus, net capital inflows have been recently on the 
rise (Figure 7), and broad money (M3) growth has accelerated, driven by the accumulation of 
net foreign assets in the banking system (Figure 8). Bank balance sheets have strengthened 
and the lending-deposit spread is the highest recorded in recent years (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 8. Increased liquidity 
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Net domestic credit (public)
M3 growth
 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, 2007. 
Figure 9. Lending looks profitable 
















Source: Asian Development Outlook, 2007 
 
… but there is still little willingness to invest.  Despite the more favorable environment, the 
savings-investment gap widened in recent years and the domestic appetite for investment 
remained stagnant (Table 2 and Figure 10). As a result of present growth and deficits, the 
“public debt-to-GDP ratio” is declining, but public investment has not picked up. The low 
and declining lending interest rate (Figure 9) suggests that, in spite of the ample liquidity, the 
demand for credit is not increasing. Also, despite the favorable lending-deposit spread, banks 
are cautious in their lending to the private sector (Figure 12), preferring to finance the 
government in local and foreign currency.
14 In short, the private sector still invests little. 
Without a deeper reform of the investment climate, businesses are unlikely to lift spending on 
new plant and equipment (World Bank, 2005c). 
                                                 
13 The surplus is largely remittances-driven, see Figure 22. 
14 Government securities now comprise about a third of the banks’ portfolio. 
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China 8.2  15.2  9.9  12.0 
South East Asia      
 Indonesia  8.9  11.5  -5.9  7.2 
 Malaysia  7.0  17.7  -6.6  2.2 
  Philippines  0.4 5.3 0.2 1.1 
 Thailand  8.5  12.3  -14.5  8.6 
NIEs      
 Chinese Taipei  7.4  9.2  1.7  3.1 
 Hong Kong, China  5.3  9.3  -0.2  0.7 
 Korea  8.6  11.5  -1.8  2.9 
 Singapore  6.3  13.1  0.6  -1.5 
Source: World Bank, 2006a. Compound annual 
th  
Figure 10. … is stagnant (2002-06) 
Real Fixed Investment 





















Trend Growth 2002 Q1 - 2006 Q4
                   Investment     GDP
Indonesia         8.2%         5.2%
Malaysia           4.6%         6.2%
Philippines      -0.2%         6.0%
Thailand           10.3%       5.7%
 
Can the investment slowdown be structural? Potential causes of the investment slowdown 
are cyclical factors such as the pre-1997 investment boom, the impact of the financial crisis, 
and the 2001 global high tech recession. But policy makers are concerned that weak 
investment may reflect not only cyclical but also deep-seated factors, signaling more 
permanent or long term difficulties in achieving higher growth (Table 2 and Table 3).
15 
Indeed, the corporate élite - comfortably protected by political ties - finds convenient 
investing only a portion of its revenues in-country, and keeps sending considerable portions 
offshore.  
 
Table 3. Fixed Investment (as % of GDP)- Pre and Post Crisis Periods 
  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 




















Latest in 2006*  21.5  28.0  20.4  14.6  29.6 
Bottom – Peak (extent of decline)  -10.2  -9.5  -23.6  -9.8  -20.2 
Latest – Bottom (extent of recovery)  2.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  8.7 
Latest – Peak  -8.2  -9.5  -23.2  -9.8  -11.5 
Source: World Bank, 2006a.  */ until the second or third quarter depending on data availability.   
 
                                                 
15 Indeed, in the 1980s (1980-89) investment spending grew at 0.4 percent. In the first part of the 1990s 
(1990-96) growth rose at 5.3 percent, but between 1997-2001, investment growth was again stagnant at 0.2 
percent. In 2001-05, despite the economic recovery, fixed investment picked up modestly (investment 
growth averaged only around 1 percent). 
  13In 2006, investment continued its decline as a share of GDP to below 15 percent. Public 
construction increased slightly, while private construction and acquisition of durable 
equipment contracted.  Investment in durable equipment fell to 6 percent of GDP, its lowest 
share since 1985. Real fixed investment levels remain below the 1997 peak levels (Table 3). 
 
 
2. Why the decline? Investment is not a driver of current growth  
 
 
Three reasons explain the puzzle.  Investment is declining in an open-and-growing 
economy because of the interaction of the following three factors. 
 
a.  First, the public sector – constrained by serious fiscal pressures, due to decades of 
weak revenue performance, a weighty debt service and a high cost of inputs – cannot 
keep public investment growing at GDP growth rates;  
 
b.  Second, the capital-intensive private sector expects low returns and does not want to 
expand investment at the economy’s fast pace. MPK is low, for two reasons: i) the 
public sector does not invest enough to provide incentives for private investment (as 
the return to private investment depends on both quantity and quality of public capital 
spending); and ii) inputs are expensive because of élite-capture in the traditional 
sectors of the economy (agriculture, sea and air transport, power, cement, mining, 
banking, etc). There, the politically-connected corporate conglomerates, protected by 
favorable rules and regulations, enjoy barriers to entry and market power, and hence 
sell at a high price their products (agricultural commodities, transport services, 
electricity, cement, etc.), which are critical inputs for both upstream and downstream 
sectors; and 
 
c.  Third, the fast-growing businesses in the service sector (electronics assembly, voice-
based BPO, and ICT), do not need to increase their investment at GDP growth rates 
to enjoy fast-rising profits. 
  14 
2a. The public sector cannot invest 
 
As the government struggles with severe fiscal pressures, public investment keeps 
falling. Decades of weak revenue performance, demanding debt service and fiscal constraints 
– along with a high cost of inputs, particularly for electricity, and an ineffective service 
delivery – led to expenditure compression; as a result, the government underinvested in 
infrastructure. Similar constraints have undermined the quality of education, historically a 
point of strength in the Philippines
16, and health (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Sectoral Budget Allocations, 2004-2006 
 2004  2005  2006 
Economic Services  19.4  17.2  18.7 
Agric. & Agr. Reform  3.3  2.8  2.6 
Social Services  28.9  27.7  27.9 
Education 14.9  14.7  13.9 
Health 1.7  1.4  1.3 
Defense 4.9  4.8  5.0 
General Public Services  16.1  15.4  15.3 
Net Lending  0.7  0.8  0.8 
Debt Interest Payments  30.1  34.1  32.3 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0   
Source: Government and Ateneo Center for Economic Research and Development, 2007. 
 
In 2002-05, deficit reduction was driven primarily by expenditure compression. In 
recent years, despite the large spending needs, infrastructure and social spending growth has 
been slow (Table 4). In these key sectors, spending levels declined both as a share of GDP, as 
a share of the total budget, and on a per capita basis. Roads maintenance, an item with high 
economic return, was consistently under-funded. 
 
In 2006, policy credibility improved … The bulk of the adjustment was due to the 
implementation of the VAT reforms
17. The fiscal consolidation fostered macroeconomic 
                                                 
16 The lack of resources available for both basic and higher education is already resulting in poor 
mathematics and science scores in international comparisons, and a declining proficiency in English 
(World Bank, 2005c). 
17 The 2006 VAT reforms raised tax revenue by 22 percent, increasing the tax/GDP ratio from 13 percent in 
2005 to about 14.2 percent in 2006. This marked the first significant increase in tax effort since the post-
Asian crisis collapse of tax revenue. 
  15stability, and - by way of lower deficits - decreased risk premia and interest costs
18, and is 
creating room for productive expenditure in the budget. Financial markets have reacted with 
optimism: stocks
19, the peso and reserves have all risen significantly, as have foreign direct 
investment and capital inflows.
20  
 
… but the fiscal adjustment might be too recent to convince investors. The increase in the 
2006 tax effort reflected implementation of the VAT reforms, while the collection of 
(corporate and personal) income taxes and excise taxes was insufficient.  The public-debt-to-
GDP ratio remains high at about 77 percent, the fiscal position is still fragile and significant 
interest payments (Table 4) still expose the economy to swings in financial market sentiment. 
Hence, containing the risk premium with further tax efforts and steady progress on reforms is 
crucial. Concerns about the long history of macroeconomic volatility, the unsettled political 
climate, and (the unpredictability in the incidence of) corruption add to risks for investors 
(World Bank, 2005c). 
 
2b. The capital-intensive private sector does not want to invest 
 
The expectations on future profitability of investment are low. The capital-intensive 
private sector does not want to increase investment because it expects low returns (World 
Bank, 2005c). In the corporate sector, the MPK - calculated as market value/asset value, that 
is the Tobin’s Q - has been falling since the early 1990s, and, since the Asian crisis, it has 
been lower than in neighboring countries (Figure 11).
21 Despite the more favorable 
investment environment, the demand for domestic credit has been falling and the banks have 
been reluctant to lend (Figure 12). Indeed, a low MPK reduces the expectations about future 
profitability and thus the willingness to invest, and, over the years, has contributed to the 
decline of fixed investment.  
                                                 
18 Spreads for government borrowing have fallen along with inflation. 
19 Equity prices are approaching their pre-Asian crisis highs. 
20 The Philippine stock market was among the top East Asian performers, and in early 2007 continued to 
rise towards pre-Asian crisis highs. 
21 Aquino (2003) calculates the Tobin’s Q of the Filipino corporate sector. While the firms with higher 
Tobin’s Q can more easily and less expensively finance their investment with external financing, firms with 
low Tobin’s Q are considered to have lower growth potential and the market might require higher external 
finance premiums in raising funds. This analysis, however, occurred when equity prices were considerably 
lower than current levels. 
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Source: S&PIFC EMDB - Price to Book Value Ratios  
Figure 12. … little appetite for investment 


































Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, 2007. 
 
Why a low productivity of capital? In the traditional sectors of the economy, several rent-
seeking corporate conglomerates, controlled by the local élite, use their political connections 
to: a) hinder tax collection, hence hampering public capital spending (which is a necessary 
condition for private investment: for example, the availability of public infrastructure is 
essential to stimulate the private sector’s willingness to invest); and b) limit economic entry, 
drive potential investors out, discourage smaller firms to grow bigger, produce expensive 
inputs, and enjoy market power and oligopolistic rents. As a result, MPK is low because of: i) 
insufficient public investment; and ii) a high cost of inputs, due to élite capture (Figure 13). 
 
Oligopolies further reduce the investment appetite. Operating as monopolies and 
oligopolies, the corporate conglomerates find convenient to restrict production – and 
investment - below the competitive level.
22 Also, their willingness to invest is inhibited by 
their concentrated ownership structure, and their uncertainties about the stability and duration 
of government favoritism.
23  
                                                 
22 Monopolists produce where the marginal revenue equals its marginal cost, and not where the average 
revenue the marginal cost. Oligopolists are aware of the actions of the others and always take into account 
the likely responses of the other market participants. 
23 Under Marcos, conglomerate owners who had close ties to the government enjoyed lasting favoritism, 
which guaranteed a predictable business environment and a longer term investment horizon. This 
“organized corruption” was not replaced by a predictable system of rules, regulations, and contract 
enforcement. In other words, the country moved from “organized” to “disorganized corruption”. 
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2bi. Insufficient Public Investment 
 
   Source: Author. 
 
2bi. Insufficient public investment 
 
Low public investment is a bottle-neck for private investment. Compared with its Asian 
neighbors, the country ranks low in transport comparisons (railroads, port, and air), and 
educational achievement. The declining quantity and quality of public investment, especially 
in infrastructure and education, provide little incentives for private investment and constitutes 
a bottle-neck to long-term economic growth. For example - according to the recent 
Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) - high transport costs have weakened the private 
sectors’ willingness to invest in agriculture; and in manufacturing, inadequate infrastructure 
  18services, especially power and transport, constrained firms’ capital spending (World Bank, 
2005c). 
 
2bii. Expensive inputs  
 
In traditional sectors, corporate conglomerates benefit from dominant positions. In the 
capital-intensive sectors of the economy, the key corporate conglomerates - profiting from a 
mode of production surviving from the country’s historical past - use their political 
connections to create rents, by limiting economic entry and selling their products at a high 
price. Since all industries in the economy, to be able to produce and grow, require inputs 
from agriculture, maritime and air transport, power, cement, banking, etc., these sectors are 
strategic; indeed, they have multiple backward and forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958). For 
example, transport has both backward and forward linkages for manufacturing. 
 
Expensive inputs limit domestic investment. As the cost of the strategic inputs is inflated 
by élite capture, investment remains low. In the agricultural sector, farmers do not invest 
because of the expensive inputs, the poor access to credit, and the incomplete land reform 
program. In manufacturing, investors are reluctant because of the costs of complying with 
regulations, especially related to customs, trade, and labor markets, corruption, and 
uncertainty in economic policies (World Bank, 2005c). Also the level of FDI (Figure 4) 
remains below the norm for Southeast Asia. 
 
Agricultural commodities are protected ... Government support to agriculture, which 
accounts for 36 percent of employment, is the result of both a long-standing favoritism to 
large land-owners
24 and strong sentiments for the (still unrealized) goal of food self-
sufficiency. Over the last two decades, domestic rice prices have consistently been kept 
above the world price (Figure 14).
25 Corn, sugar, poultry, and the livestock industry receive 
even higher levels of protection. 
                                                 
24 The skewed land distribution stems from the colonial period. 
25 This has had several adverse repercussions: by reducing rice consumption, it has disproportionately 
impacted the poor; it has increased the income disparity between rich rice farm households and landless 
laborers, it has retarded crop diversification; it has lowered Philippine wage competitiveness; and it has 
been costly fiscally. Indeed, the National Food Authority (NFA) buys rice at market rates and sells at 
subsidized rates, piling up deficits in the process. 
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  … and risk taking is not rewarded. The well-connected have easier and relatively 
unscrutinized access to credit, as banks – usually associated to the key conglomerates - do not 
thoroughly assess the expected returns on their investment; as a result of their inadequate 
knowledge to pick “winners”, average or mediocre projects get implemented. On the other 
hand, farmers under-invest in high-risk but high-return crops because they cannot afford 
insurance. 
 
Figure 14. Rice: a domestic price above the world price produces rents 























































Source: World Bank, 2006 and World Bank, 2007b. 
 
The maritime and aviation sectors, dominated by conglomerates, are not open to 
competition. The resulting high transportation costs undermine competitiveness, trading, 
tourism, and agriculture. For example, the price for exporting a 20-foot container from the 
Philippines is 60-300 percent higher than in other Asian countries (Table 5). By opening up 
its seas and skies - as long as competition is protected by rules and policies - the Philippines 
could become in the next few years a transport-and-logistics-hub in the Asia-Pacific region, 
and a competitive destination for tourism, medical services and retirement. 
 
  20Table 5. Exporting a container can cost up to three times more… 
 
20-footer container  US Dollars
26
 
Philippines                      1,336 
Thailand                                848 
China                            335 
Singapore                                382 
 Source: World Bank, 2007 on Cross-Border Trading, 2006. 
 
Port operations largely remain a monopoly. Philippines’ ports are rated as the least 
competitive among those in eight major Asian countries (World Economic Forum, 2004). 
Until the reforms in the 1990s, port development and operation was a government monopoly; 
only a few private ports were allowed to operate commercially. Today, most ports are public, 
administered by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). The sector suffers from a lack of 
credibility in pursuing open and fair competition between ports and among port operators.  
 
The airline sector is also highly concentrated and oligopolistic. Today, air transport 
carries about 70 percent of exports
27 and 98 percent of visitor arrivals. The country is 
endowed with a (mostly underutilized) network of airports, but the development of the sector 
is limited by a dominant conglomerate; indeed, the national flag carrier enjoys the 
government’s protection and preferential allocation of state aid, subsidies, and airport slots. 
In the past, liberalizing entry of foreign carriers into the local market proved successful: the 
entry of three competitors
28 in 1995 and of two low-cost carriers
29 in 2005 lowered fares and 
increased choice.  
 
Electricity and cement are oligolipolistic markets. The electricity industry is dominated by 
three large companies, with around 70 percent of the total electricity generated by the largest 
supplier.
30 The cement market structure is highly concentrated
31, and - reflecting lack of 
                                                 
26 The cost does not include ocean freight and consists of several items/charges – documentation, inland 
transportation, customs clearance and technical control, ports and terminal handling. 
27 By value. 
28 Cebu Pacific, Asian Spirit and Air Philippines. The major beneficiary of this entry was the domestic 
passenger market, with a wider range of choices (e.g., airlines, flights, fares) and growth in traffic.   
29 Air Asia and Tiger Airways. Between 2004  and 2006, passenger traffic increased from less than 50,000 
to more than 470,000.  In 2006, the two low-cost carriers, accounted for 83 percent of the passenger traffic. 
30 By 2006, only 11 percent of power generation capacity had been privatized, compared to the original 
target of 70 percent, mandated by the Electric Power Industry Reform Act. 
31 The top three firms - the multinationals Holcim, LaFarge and Cemex - account for nearly 90 percent of 
installed clinker capacity of 22mn tones, while four independent producers account for the rest. Between 
2000 and 2005, when demand fell, cement producers increased prices by as much as 75 percent. 
  21competition - local prices are amongst the highest (Table 6) and per-capita-consumption 
amongst the lowest in East Asia (Table 7).  
 
Table 6. Cement prices are the highest … 
 








Source: World Bank, 2007 on JP Morgan and 
National Associations 
 
Table 7. … and consumption is the lowest 
 








Source: World Bank, 2007 on Cement 
Manufacturers Associations 
 
2c. The rest of the private sector does not need to invest 
 
Economic growth is led by services. In average, in the past few years, agriculture kept 
growing slower than GDP, at almost 5 percent, and industry continued to grow on pace with 
GDP, at nearly 5.5 percent.
32 In the same period, growth and profits came from the service 
sector. Boosted by private services (telecoms, electronics assembly, finance, voice-based 
BPO, and ICT-enabled services) and driven by a double-digit export growth (Figure 23), the 
sector is the economy’s fastest growing (although not able to provide adequate employment 
opportunities), expanding at 6.3 percent and accounting for 3 percentage points of total GDP 
growth in 2006 (Figure 15).  
 
The nature of growth is becoming less capital-intensive. While in recent years the 
investment in manufacturing has been consistently declining, the investment in services was 
stable, and – despite its relatively low level – able to support the sector’s steady growth 
(Figure 16). As the service sector is less investment-intensive than industry, future economic 
growth is compatible with lower investment rates than implied by historical data. To enjoy 
rising profits, the service sector does not need to increase investment faster than GDP growth 
rates.  
 
                                                 
32 Mining - despite its untapped potential - witnessed a contraction. 
  22Figure 15. Services are growing fast … 
 















Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 
2007. 


























Source: Author’s elaboration on National 
Statistical Coordination Board, 2007. 
 
FDI are also flowing to less capital-intensive activities. In 2006, net FDI - growing but still 
small - reached $2.35 billion, compared with $1.85 billion in 2005.
33 The inflows were 
sustained by the country’s macroeconomic gains, including the fiscal and external position, 
and the declining inflation. Net FDI went mainly to non-capital-intensive niches in 
manufacturing and services. In manufacturing, the investments went to chemicals, electronics 
and air-conditioning system. In services, the inflows were in BPO, shipping crew training and 
medical research. 
 
                                                 
33 However, 43 percent of the FDI was in the form of inter-company loans rather than new equity. 
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3. What keeps growth going? The least protected sectors of the economy 
 
 
Despite the decline in investment, the economy keeps growing; this is because its least 
protected sectors - the informal labor market and the non-capital-intensive activities - 
stimulate demand and drive supply. Indirectly, they are also lowering the penalty for poor 
policies in both the oligopolic capital-intensive sectors and the formal labor market, thus 
perpetuating the status quo (Figure 25). 
 
On the demand-side, massive labor migration results in remittances that fuel 
consumption-led-growth. A heavily-protected formal labor market and its comparatively 
high wages buy “national labor peace”, but its constrained growth spurs massive emigration 
flows in the growing working age population. The resulting remittances and transfers - 
which, combined, account for over 13 percent of GDP - keep the economy going, by fuelling 
consumption. 
 
On the supply-side, a few non-capital-intensive manufactures and services boost 
exports. Free from rent-capturing regulations, non-capital-intensive exports drive the 
economy. Indeed, recent growth (in 2006, real GDP grew by 5.4 percent and real GNP by 6.2 
percent) was driven by exports, with a strong performance in electronics.  
 
3a. Unhappy work-seekers leave and send remittances, fuelling consumption 
 
Workers cannot easily enter into the formal labor market. Heavy labor rules and 
protections - enforced by large enforcement agencies (which employ some 20,000 labor 
inspectors) - hamper job growth in the formal labor market (Figure 25 – A and Figure 28). In 
2006, unemployment was higher than in neighboring countries, at almost 8 percent (Figure 
17), and underemployment grew to 22.7 percent (from 17.6 percent in 2004).  
 















































































Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 
2007. 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Lanzona and National 
Statistical Coordination Board Annual Business 
Surveys, 2007. 
 
Qualified workers are increasingly moving overseas ( Table 8). Wage-setting does not 
reflect supply and demand. Despite the higher wages in the service sector (Figure 18), 32.3 
percent of the unemployed were high-school graduates and 18.4 percent were college 
graduates.  
 
Table 8. Overseas Workers by Occupation 
Based on work contracts only            (in percent)  1993 2004 
Service workers  34.9  40.2 
Professional and technical  25.3  33.4 
Production 36.4  22.6 
Clerical 1.6  1.9 
Sales 1.0  1.4 
Administrative and managerial  0.1  0.2 
Agricultural 0.7  0.2 
Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 2007. 
 
As oligopolistic rents secure “national labor peace”, the formal labor market is for well-
paid insiders… Recent comparisons suggest that local wages tend to be high for the 
unskilled workers (Figure 19) and the skilled ones (Figure 20). By paying higher wages - 
relative to other Asian countries - to the salaried insiders, the politically-connected corporate 
conglomerates use the rents resulting from the government’s preferential treatment
34 to 
stabilize the economic system, secure “national labor peace”, and perpetuate the status quo. 
                                                 
34 For example, laws that prevent foreigners from owning land impede foreign banks to collateralize their 
loans and hence limit their lending ability. But also, as discussed, monopolistic or oligopolistic privileges: a 
dominant position and considerable pricing power. 
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   Source: JETRO, 2006 and World Bank, 2006a. 
Figure 20.  … even for skilled workers 
Monthly Wages in Low and Middle Income Asia 






































Source: JETRO 16th 
Survey of Investment 
Related Cost Comparison in 
Major Cities and regions in 
Asia. March 2006.
  
Source: JETRO, 2006 and World Bank, 2006a. 
 
The informal sector prevails and a quarter of the domestic labor force works abroad. 
Informal activities and emigration are the major outlets for underutilized labor. The wage-
and-salaried workers accounted for only about 50 percent of total employment, and the 
proportion of unpaid family workers, prevalent in agriculture and private households, is 
significant (Figure 21). In 2006, over a million work-seekers left the country for employment 
overseas, where some 8½ million Filipinos work, about a quarter of the domestic labor force 
and a tenth of the population (Figure 25 – F).
35 
 













Source: National Statistics Office
 
Source: World Bank, 2007a. 














































Source: World Development Indicators, 2007. 
 
                                                 
35 During the first four months of 2007 the number of residents leaving the country to work abroad 
increased by 7.8 percent, to 343,4000 persons relative to the same period in 2006. 
  26In 2006, remittances grew by 20 percent to $12.8 billion, boosting domestic 
consumption. The flows of remittances and transfers from overseas workers have grown 
rapidly (Figure 22); at about 13 percent of GDP, they fuel - and reduce the volatility of - 
private consumption (Figure 25 - G), especially in the informal sector. For 2007 they are 
expected to reach $14.7 billion, five percent higher than in 2006. Through these flows, large 
trade deficits have been transformed into current account surpluses (estimated at over 3 
percent of GDP in 2006). 
 
3b. The service sector boost exports, lifting growth 
 
Dynamic growth has occurred in a few specific non capital-intensive sub-sectors.  On the 
supply side, the service sector (Figure 25 - D) is on the rise, and already accounts for more 
than half of the GDP. Within services the major drivers of growth are consumer electronics, 
telecommunications, the financial sector, private services such as voice-based BPO, and 
tourism. In the future, knowledge process outsourcing (KPO), accounting, legal services, 
medical services and tourism (including medical tourism) are expected to grow considerably.  
 
The country is riding on the high demand for electronics products and offshore IT 
services, by virtue of being in the world’s most dynamic region. In the past few years, 
electronics exports drove growth, especially of semiconductors, and back office activities 
such as BPO or call centers (Figure 23). Despite the recent appreciation of the real effective 
peso exchange rate, the export performance of the electronics industry has steadily increased, 
representing today almost 70 percent of the export earnings; and semiconductors, mainly 
exported to Taiwan and China, account for 47 percent of total merchandise exports. While 
exports to China are growing very rapidly, back office activities are mainly exported to the 
US.  
 
  27Figure 23. Semiconductors lead exports 
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Figure 24. TFP is leading the way 
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Total factor productivity (TFP) - rather than capital or labor - spurred recent growth. 
Although TFP growth has been much lower than in the rest of East Asia (World Bank, 
2005a), it picked up significantly during 2004-06. While two years might be too short of a 
time span for reaching robust conclusions, the recent spike might be capturing cyclical effects 
in capacity utilization and the lagged effect of past structural reforms (Figure 24).  
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4. What is the result? The economy is in a “Low-Capital-Stock” equilibrium 
 
 
No economic agent with rational foresight has incentives to unilaterally raise 
investment.  The public sector cannot jeopardize macroeconomic stability. The domestic 
private sector is profitable in the status quo. The international private sector is reluctant to 
settle in a highly-protected business environment. Competition is undermined by regulatory 
capture of major agencies, which increases unpredictability in regulatory policy, adding to 
investor uncertainty (World Bank, 2005c). When deciding to increase investment, the first-
mover bears short-term costs, and faces strong disincentives.  
 
In the medium term, the public sector does not have the resources to significantly step 
up investment. While public investment has been very low in recent years, today, if tax 
collection continues to improve, falling interest-payments-to-GDP would allow for rising 
public investment within a balanced budget framework.  However, in the next few years the 
government is likely to keep its expenditures in check, continue its fiscal consolidation, and 
focus on reducing macroeconomic volatility. 
 
The domestic private sector makes enough money within the status quo, and is reluctant 
to invest. In the domestic private sector, investment is low because of the combined effect of 
two factors. On the one hand, the capital-intensive sectors - dominated by well-protected 
monopolistic and oligopolistic insiders, and facing a low MPK - restrict production below the 
competitive level.
36 On the other hand, in the non-capital-intensive sectors businesses are 
very profitable - and fast-growing - with relatively little investment efforts (Figure 16). 
 
Foreign investors “stay out” and non-élite businesses “stay small and informal”. What is 
described above results in barriers to the entry of potential investors into the economy. For 
foreign investors - discouraged by a net of privileges and protections (e.g., in the banking 
sector and in the formal labor market), by policy-driven competitiveness shortcomings (i.e., 
the effects of agricultural and industrial protection) and by the lack of resources for education 
                                                 
36 Monopolists produce where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and not where average revenue 
equals marginal cost. 
  29and training - the incentives are to stay out. For the small firms, not belonging to the 
corporate élite, the incentives are to stay small and not to become formal (Figure 25 - B).  
 
The economic system is in equilibrium at a low-level of capital stock. The country is 
growing at a quick pace despite the low savings
37 and low investment. The status quo, far 
from being optimal, “works”, and will keep underlying the economic fundamentals in the 
short-medium term. Economic growth comes – and, will very likely keep coming - from 
“not-capital intensive” activities, mainly services, and from consumption, spurred by 
remittances. In the traditional sectors, the conglomerates enjoy the rents granted by limited 
economic entry, and through high wages rents keep buying “national labor peace” (Figure 25 
- E). This, coupled with the heavy protections in the formal labor market (Figure 25 - A), 
stimulate additional emigration and further remittances (Figure 25 - G). The copious 
remittances reduce the workers’ incentives to abandon the informal sector. The resulting self-
interested political constituencies, in equilibrium, perpetuate the status quo, where low levels 
of investments are rational, and the economy is in a “low-capital-stock” equilibrium.  
 
The growth path is sustainable in the short-medium term. The drivers of growth are not 
expected to change significantly over the next few years. On the supply side, electronics 
assembly and back office activities will drive exports (Figure 25 - D). On the demand side, 
remittances - arriving mainly from the Gulf and the US - will foster consumption and spur 
growth via multiplier (Figure 25 - G). As a result, the growth pattern - although not creating 
jobs - seems sustainable in the short-medium tem. 
 
                                                 
37 Public savings are in short supply because of the low tax collection, household savings are minimal 
because of the combined effect of the low salaries in the informal sector and the incoming flow of 
remittances, and corporate savings suffer the low productivity of the capital and labor. Additionally, only a 
portion of the savings of the corporate élite is invested in-country, while considerable portions are invested 
offshore. 
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Figure 25. The status quo: a “low-capital-stock equilibrium” 
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5. Why is this a concern? Growth could be faster and more inclusive 
 
 
The economy needs to move from its “low-capital-stock” equilibrium to a higher one. 
The “low-capital-stock” equilibrium is good for the well-protected conglomerates, but is it 
good for the country? Undeniably, the status quo is delivering economic growth, but it is 
difficult to see how - in the longer term - a sufficiently robust growth can be sustained at 
present levels of investment. In other words, today’s inadequate investment is curtailing a 
speedier and more inclusive economic growth, which is essential to deal with the country’s 
longer term development challenges (i.e., generate more jobs and reduce poverty). In order to 
achieve such growth, the Philippines need to reach a “high-capital-stock” steady state. 
 
The country’s growth potential is untapped. Strategic growth opportunities are lost. If 
compared with the booming East Asian neighborhood, the Philippines has had, and - in the 
status quo - is projected to have, a more modest trajectory (World Bank, 2007). To reach its 
growth potential and sustain it in the long term, the economy needs to take better advantage 
of its geographical location and - by offering appealing opportunities within the regional 
context - attract more domestic and foreign investment to its core sectors. But to deliver 
faster growth, the country needs to address its lack of competitiveness. 
 
The Philippines can hardly compete with its neighbors. For instance, the labor market is 
far from competitive. Relative to the other East Asian countries, due to a higher wage 
structure, unit labor costs are higher for broad ranges of manufacturing, and the country is 
finding it difficult to compete with lower wage economies particularly at the unskilled end of 




                                                 
38 At 1 percent per annum average growth in output per worker in the Philippines during 1961-2003 versus 
4.4 percent in neighboring economies (World Bank, 2005a). 
  32The presence of oligopolies in the traditional sectors of the economy hampers the 
country’s competitiveness.
39 Agricultural protection creates rents, raises food prices and – 
by impacting wages - undermines labor competitiveness. Port and airline oligopolies make 
trade costly and tourism less attractive. Most banks, given their corporate ownership, lend 
within their conglomerate, limiting access to outsiders or unconnected companies,
40 which 
face a declining availability of credit. In the electricity and cement sectors, oligopolistic rents 
undermine cost competitiveness across a broad range of fixed investments, especially in 
infrastructure. As a result, international foreign asset holdings are below regional benchmarks 
(Figure 26), although at a level comparable with those of economies with similar GDP per 
capita (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 26. International Foreign Asset 
Holdings, 2004 
 































Figure 27. International Foreign Asset 
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Sources: IMF, Consolidated Portfolio Investment Survey, 2007. World Development Indicators, 2007. 
 
Growth is not inclusive. Over 2002-2006, higher growth did not translate into higher 
employment. The Philippines is characterized by jobless growth (Figure 28). Between 2004 
and 2006, employment rose only by 2.5 percent on average each year. Services, primarily 
                                                 
39 In 2006, the Philippines continued to receive low rankings international competitiveness surveys, 
including those of the World Competitiveness Yearbook (49
th of 61), the World Bank (113
th of 155), and 
World Economic Forum (77
th of 120). 
40 In recent years, banking sector vulnerabilities were addressed but credit to the private sector has 
continued to decline in real terms. Asset quality is still below regional and world standards but banking 
sector vulnerabilities were reduced via the take out of non-performing loans and assets from commercial 
bank balance sheets. 
  33wholesale and retail trade, accounted for two thirds of the employment gain, and agriculture a 
quarter. In 2006, employment growth slowed to 2 percent, below the growth of the working 
age population. 
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Source: Author’s elaboration on World Development 
Indicators, 2007. 
 
For the past few years, poverty reduction has been slower than in the rest of East Asia 
(Figure 29), and rural poverty remains high. In the Philippines, 70 percent of the poor live 
in rural areas. However, the agricultural sector - traditionally more protected than the rest of 
the economy (David, Intal, Balisacan, 2007) - is not reducing poverty. In the past years, 
agricultural GDP grew at modest rates, productivity growth was low by regional standards
41, 
and labor productivity and yield stagnated. The recent agrarian reform - while successful in 
transferring income and wealth from landlords to tenants - did not have a significant pro-poor 
impact (Balisacan and Fuwa, 2007), as the benefits bypassed landless agricultural laborers 
(Hayami, Quisimbing, and Adriano, 1990).
42 
 
The sustainability of the growth model is exposed to longer term risks. In the long run, of 
the two engines of growth (export-led services and remittances-fuelled consumption), the 
                                                 
41 Between 1980 and 1998, total agricultural factor productivity has grown at 9 percent, compared to 27 
percent in Thailand and 49 percent in Indonesia (World Bank, 2007b). 
42 Indeed, to succeed, land reform needs to combine access to land, credit, and technology. 
  34first might “cannibalize” the second. As the service sector grows and creates employment 
opportunities, the present labor outflows might get absorbed by the domestic economy. Also, 
when first-generation emigrants diminish in volume, remittances inevitably decline: in those 
countries where emigrants are allowed to settle - when the first generation comes to the end 
of its working life, and the ties between the following generations and the country of origin 
weaken - the second and third generation emigrants tend to remit a lower proportion of their 
income (Kleinschmidt, 2006).  
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6. What can be done? Diversify the economy and gradually push reforms 
 
 
A three-pronged strategy for incremental reforms ... To sustain development in the long-
term, the economy needs a competitive diversification: from the distortions induced by the 
oligopolistic conglomerates to a market-driven expansion of non-traditional products. To 
bypass the foreseeable resistance of the well-established rent-seekers, the government should 
follow a phased strategy:  
 
a.  First, promote the production and export of non-traditional manufacturing and 
services, by getting the economic zones to perform better (Box 1),  and pursuing a 
competitive real exchange rate;  
 
b.  Second, increase revenues, to finance the needed boost in infrastructure and 
education spending; and  
 
c.  Third, implement gradual reforms to tackle the rent-seeking conglomerate economy, 
to lower the cost of strategic inputs. 
 
… to steadily build a pro-reform constituency. Given the strength of rent-seeking interests, 
the reform of oligopolistic practices in the traditional sectors of the economy can occur only 
gradually (Auty 2007, Auty and Pontara, 2008). Over time, as a result of the three-pronged 
approach, the expanding competitive sectors should shrink the relative importance of 
patronage networks, and build - in association with the businesses that are currently bearing 
the costs of rent-seeking - a pro-reform political constituency. 
 
6a. Pursue better-performing economic zones and a competitive exchange rate 
 
For speedier growth, policies should promote the manufacturing - and export - of new 
and more sophisticated products. Cross country comparisons show that growth 
accelerations are associated with the production and export of non-traditional manufacturing 
and services, in other words the products “in demand” in the industrialized nations 
  36(Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik, 2005; Jones and Olken, 2005; Rodrik, 2006). Hence, 
development policies should strategically promote a structural transformation toward these 
“more sophisticated” economic activities, by providing production incentives to new 
exportables (Rodrik, 2006).  
 
A key starting point is improving the performance of the economic zones … In the 
Philippines, the track record of the economic zones is mixed (Box 1): while they attract FDI 
and generate the majority of exports of non-traditional manufacturing (semiconductors - 
Figure 23) and voice-based services (BPO or call centers - Figure 15), they have been far less 
successful than in other countries in finding their niche, attracting investment and fostering 
economic development.  
 
Box 1. Getting the “ecozones” right 
 
 
Economic zones: not always good news. Over the last three decades, several developing countries – when 
a rapid nation-wide reform of their governance was neither possible nor credible - created “economic 
zones” to promote trade, spur exports and stimulate economic development. These industrial enclaves 
created new employment and increased export flows. Thirty years ago, 80 economic zones in 30 countries 
generated about 1 million direct jobs and US$6 billion in exports; today, 3,000 economic zones operate in 
120 countries, employ 50 million people and account for more than US$ 600 billion in exports. However, 
in quite a few cases, these zones had adverse effects: higher-than-expected construction and maintenance 
costs, unstable employment (offered mainly to unskilled and low-wage female labor), weak links to local 
manufacturers, insufficient transfers of know-how (i.e., labor or managerial skills) and technology, and – 
thus - little domestic added value. 
 
In the Philippines, the ecozones need to improve their performance. The Philippines was one of the 
first Asian countries in developing economic zones (“ecozones”). Today, the government-owned 
investment promotion agency (Philippine Economic Zone Authority – PEZA) supervises 41 private-owned 
and 4 government-owned ecozones. At first, these enclaves - conceived as a substitute for a good 
investment climate and designed to operate separately from the surrounding communities - offered 
“imported institutions” to new exporters (i.e., producers of non-traditional manufacturing, voice-based ICT 
services). However, their inadequate legal and regulatory framework resulted in a lack of fully competitive 
conditions, and large investors - not expecting sufficient returns to compensate their risks - have been 
reluctant to settle in. Additionally, the ecozones often offer distortionary incentives, which add to the 
government’s fiscal burden (i.e., a considerable amount of existing revenue is lost through tax avoidance). 
 
What makes an economic zone successful? Only well-designed and effectively run economic zones can 
lead to additional infrastructure, FDI, employment, foreign exchange earnings, transfers of new 
technologies and skills, and - as a result - national revenues and economic growth. To be successful, a zone 
must lie in a geographically defined area, where domestic and foreign agents can find: (i) first-rate 
infrastructure and human capital; (ii) investment incentives and simplified procedures; (iii) domestic and 
international linkages; (iv)  enabling institutions, such as - for instance - an equal treatment of domestic and 
foreign firms, and transparent dispute reconciliation mechanisms; and (v) coordination with a 
comprehensive country-wide reform, in the context of an overall growth strategy. Examples are the Export 
Processing Zones in Singapore and Malaysia in the 1970s, and the Special Economic Zones in China, in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
Source: Devereux and Chen, 1985; Rondinelli, 1987; Blomström and Kokko, 2003. 
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… while pursuing a stable and competitive real effective exchange rate
43. Despite the 
current incentives of the Central Bank (favorable to an appreciating exchange rate because of 
the large dollar-denominated external debt and its effects on income statements), a volatile 
and appreciated currency is not conducive to the expansion of new exportables, and 
negatively affects the production of tradables (Williamson, 2003; Prasad, Rajan, and 
Subramanian, 2007). Hence, to foster the diversification of the industrial base, to induce 
investment and entrepreneurship in tradables, and to promote the production and export of 
non-traditional manufacturing and services, it is necessary to pursue a stable and competitive 




Box 2. Getting the exchange rate right 
 
 
A competitive exchange rate helps achieving rapid and sustained growth. In the past decades, fast-
growing developing countries have simultaneously exhibited not-overvalued real exchange rates, high 
domestic savings, and current account surpluses. China is the present-day example, but in recent years this 
was the case also in high-performing Asian economies such as Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, as well as in 
Chile. The opposite (an appreciated real exchange rate, low domestic saving, current account deficits - and 
low growth) is also recognized in the international experience (e.g., Mexico in 1993, Russia and Brazil in 
1998, and Argentina and Turkey in 2000). 
 
The boost in aggregate demand accelerates investment and employment. Assuming no supply 
constraints (i.e., local growth is not constrained by a lack of supply capacity, but by a shortage of demand), 
a competitive exchange rate increases demand for exports and import substitutes, and motivates 
entrepreneurs to produce non-traditional export commodities, expanding investment, employment, and 
economic grow. Conversely, when capital inflows appreciate the real exchange rate, growth gets hurt by 
reduced investment incentives. 
 
Source: Balassa 1984; Williamson, 2003; Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2007; Rodrik, 2006 and 2007a. 
 
 
How to do it? To help identifying “what the country is good at producing” (Hausmann and 
Rodrik, 2003) and, consequently, foster investments and determine the pattern of 
specialization, PEZA should make convincing commitments to improving the performance of 
the economic zones. In particular, it should: (i) provide non-fiscal incentives to the 
construction in loco of first-rate infrastructure - e.g., via public-private-partnerships (PPP – 
see page 40); (ii) guarantee simplified business procedures; (iii) enhance in situ competition, 
                                                 
43 See footnote 3 page 7. 
44 China and India have made a “stable and competitive real exchange rate” an explicit policy objective 
(Rodrik, 2006). 
  38by ensuring - for example - that local institutions treat domestic and foreign firms equally and 
transparently (e.g., in dispute reconciliation); and (iv) coordinate this “ecozones 
strengthening process” within an overall growth strategy.
45 As a result, better-performing 
economic zones will create new wealth and bring about efficiency gains - without forcing an 
immediate redistribution of oligopolistic profits. Then, the investment in non-traditional 
activities will increase, and provide demonstration effects for prospective entrants. Over time, 
the enhanced dynamism of the export-oriented sector will diffuse beyond the original 
location, acting as a catalyst for reform of the economy as a whole (Rodrik, 2006). Finally, to 
support both the stability and the competitiveness of the real exchange-rate, the government 
should stimulate higher saving rates (Williamson, 2003, Rodrik, 2007a). This can be 
achieved by (i) tightening its fiscal policy (see page 40); and (ii) sterilizing capital inflows 
and remittances. Additional measures could entail compulsory saving schemes, real wage 
discipline (i.e., wages reflects supply and demand, to reduce the wage premia of formal 
sector jobs), and capital-account management (taxation of capital account inflows). 
 
6b. Increase revenues, to finance spending in infrastructure and education 
 
Additional revenues and more public-private risk sharing in infrastructure and 
education. Over the years, the lack of infrastructure and education is becoming an evident 
bottleneck to growth, as it hurts small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and discourages entry 
and investment of domestic start-ups and foreign investors. As the extra spending in 
infrastructure and skills upgrades needs public resources, more revenues are needed - via a 
stronger tax administration and additional tax policy reform - to maintain a sound fiscal 
policy; at the same time, public spending efficiency needs to improve. As private investment 
is constrained by a number of institutional factors that are difficult to address in the short run, 
to alleviate bottlenecks the government should both: (i) reduce the risk for; and (ii) increase 
the return on private investment, starting from the ecozones. 
 
                                                 
45 Indeed, by generating not-appropriable learning, better-performing zones should also create knowledge 
spillovers, technological transfer and catch-up, train workers and managers, provide inputs (and demand) 
for new activities, and - last but not least - absorb surplus labor, hence reducing poverty (Rodrik, 2006). 
  39How to do it? To finance additional public spending, the government should increase its 
revenues as a share of GDP by strengthening tax administration and adjusting excise taxes, 
continue lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio and interest payments, and restrain non-priority 
current expenditures. To increase tax collection, the taxpayer register should include the 
corporate conglomerates and tax arrears should be audited. Indexation would ensure that 
excise revenues do not decline in real terms: excises on fuel, alcohol, and tobacco are low by 
international standards and have not kept up with inflation since the tax reform of 1997 (IMF, 
2006b). Finally, starting from the economic zones, it is necessary to stimulate risk-sharing 
among investors - for example, via PPP in infrastructure, by co-financing public works 
(transport and communications) and in education, by addressing under-provision of training 
in areas where skills are lacking. 
 
6c. Gradually reduce élite-capture, to lower the cost of strategic inputs 
 
In the traditional sectors, the rent-seekers are powerful and well established. In the 
Philippines, the status quo has historical roots: the colonial distribution of factor endowments 
determined the power and incentives of self-interested political constituencies, which, in 
equilibrium, profit from oligopolistic privileges and perpetuate them. Well-established in 
sectors that are strategic because of multiple backward and forward linkages, the 
conglomerates - by producing expensive inputs - skim rents from the economy and shrink the 
margins of the potentially most dynamic agents: the small and medium domestic private 
producers. They also control bank credit and dominate state procurement contracts through 
political connections.  
 
Less élite-capture in agriculture, maritime and air transport, electricity, and cement. To 
attract investment in the capital-intensive sectors, the corporate conglomerates should be 
restrained in their use of political connections, and their rents should be trimmed down by 
reduced economic protection. For example, promoting competition in the agriculture sector 
would lower prices, improve competitiveness in the food processing and livestock industries, 
  40increase disposable incomes for the poor and enhance labor market competitiveness.
46 There 
are also significant opportunities to stimulate the accumulation of domestic capital in the 
maritime and air transport industries, with the resolution of conflicts of interests and a 
comprehensive deregulation. Promoting competition in electricity generation and 
transmission would enhance operational efficiency, achieve financial viability, and augment 
long-term power supply capacity. To strengthen the investment climate and support market 
competition in the cement sector, it is necessary to reduce the cost of doing business through 
simplification of approval procedures. Also, in all mentioned sectors regulatory capacity and 
oversight needs to be enhanced. 
 
How to do it? To accelerate economic growth, increase employment generation, and 
generate public resources for social programs, rent seeking by the élites that exercise political 
and economic power - or “élite capture” - must be addressed. First steps are improving the 
investment climate and competitiveness, and disseminating information on the distributional 
effects of government policies. But the key measure to attract raising investment and create 
more local jobs is opening and reforming the sectors dominated by rent-seeking corporate 
conglomerates.  
 
  As shown by the de-monopolization of telecommunications, it is possible …. The 
untapped potential for growth is illustrated by the deregulation of the telecom industry (Box 
3).
47 Until the 1990s, the politically-connected Philippine Long Distance Telephone 
Company (PLDT) operated as a monopoly, and - in spite of the rising demand for phone lines 
- spent more resources in protecting its rents than in expanding its network. When the 
deregulation was announced, PLDT tried to block prospective entrants to safeguard its 
dominant market share, but was unsuccessful. By granting entry to domestic and foreign 
players, the reform spurred investment, created employment, and - over a decade - 
transformed first the industry and then the economy. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Food, and rice in particular, comprises a large share of the consumption basket of low income workers. 
Allowing rice prices to adjust towards the border price would benefit the majority of the population and the 
majority of the poor. 
47 Another example has been, between 1995 and 2005, the liberalization of foreign-carriers-entry into the 
airline sector (paragraph   0 and footnote 28 and 29, page21). 
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In the 1990s, telecoms were opened to competition. In 1990, despite the estimated 800,000 applicants, 
the sole dominant provider (PLDT) took years to install a line, and tele-density was at 1 per 100 persons. 
The deregulation shook the industry, from the dominance of a single operator to increased market 
competition, dynamism and vastly improved access to telecommunication services. By 2006, there were 6.5 
million fixed lines installed, tele-density had climbed to 7.7 and the waiting time for phone service was 
measured in days. Mobile penetration grew exponentially, from 3 million mobile phones in 1999 to over 35 
million in 2006. New investors came steadily into the market, which now counts on 73 local exchange 
carriers, 11 international gateway facilities (IGFs), 7 mobile telephones, 14 inter-carriers, and 388 value-
added service (VAS) providers.  
 
Today one of the most dynamic industries, telecommunication employs more than 20,000 people.  The 
Philippines is now an important location for new growth industries such as BPO, medical transcription and 
call centers, and other IT-enabled retail services, such as mobile-phone-based business solutions (e.g., 
through mobile phones, remittances charges are 1 percent of the average remittance value, while banks 
charge up to six times more). By 2006, the sector accounted for 5 percent of GDP, corporate profits had 
increased to $3.3 billion, and an estimated 235,000 jobs are found in industries that have benefited from the 
telecoms reforms. 
 
Source: Mirandilla 2006, World Bank, 2007, Bernardo and Tang, 2007. 
 
 
… but leadership matters. To break monopolies and increase competition in protected 
sectors, a clear vision, political will, and a coherent implementation strategy are needed 
(Bernardo and Tang, 2007).
48 In agriculture, import protection for rice should be gradually 
reduced, and public investments should be geared towards reducing farmers’ marketing and 
transaction costs. The NFA should devolve its rice trade functions to the private sector and 
focus on market regulation. In the transport sector, to promote full competition in foreign 
containerized cargo operations, ports and airlines licensing should be increased. The PPA’s 
port development and operating functions should be separated from its regulatory function. 
The aviation sector should be liberalized further, as competition would reduce airfares and 
increase the number of tourists. Greater access to bank lending for unconnected companies 
(foreign corporations, domestic medium and small firms) should be promoted. The 
government should open the domestic market to cement imports, to contain price increases, 
and simplify the numerous regulatory, land, quarrying and environmental clearances required 
in setting up a cement plant, to encourage new domestic and foreign entrants. Finally, a 
reform of the labor market is overdue, by removing protections, streamlining enforcement 
agencies, and lowering wage pressures. 
                                                 
48 According to Bernardo and Tang (2007), the electoral rules should attract qualified candidates and select 
contenders that think long-term. 
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